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The Europeanization of employment policies has been examined in the context of the 
European Employment Strategy (EES), which utilises the EU’s Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC) (Büchs 2007, Heidenreich and Zetlin 2009). This legally non-
binding mode of governance involves the establishing of EU guidelines, annual Member 
State reporting of progress, and the issuing of Country Specific Recommendations in 
areas of policy weakness. Since the OMC is a more voluntary form of governance, 
adaptational pressure is not an important factor driving the process of Europeanization, 
as there are few tangible EU pressures (López-Santana 2009: 145). Changes at the 
Member State level can be explained by the ‘creative appropriation by domestic actors’ 
who advance their own goals by embracing OMC concepts, categories and metrics, and 
hence ‘reinforce the discursive legitimacy of common European objectives and policy 
approaches’ (Zeitlin 2009: 233). Creative appropriation intersects with meditating 
factors, which also determine the degree of change and include: multiple veto points; 
mediating formal institutions; political and organizational culture; differential 
empowerment of actors; and learning (Graziano and Vink 2013, Graziano 2011).  
 
In this context government change is acknowledged has having an impact on the 
process of Europeanization (Gwiazda 2011). A limitation of the current literature is the 
implicit assumption that Europeanization it is a continuous ‘positive’ process, but it has 
very little to say when government change results in a de-prioritisation of EU objectives 
at the national level. This article analyses the process of Europeanization under such 
conditions by focusing on the UK’s engagement with the EES from the New Labour 
Governments (1997-2010) through to the Coalition Government (2010-2015). While 
New Labour had developed a broadly pro-EU position, the Coalition Government (2010-
2015) was less favourable, as its majority partner was the eurosceptic Conservative 
Party. These particular conditions enable the analysis to explore how ‘sticky’ the 
process of Europeanization was under New Labour. This is important in the context of 
the UK polity in which, despite a process of devolution since the late 1990s, the UK 
remains a relatively centralised state whereby the devolved administrations and 
regions are not in a position to be formally involved with policy making at the national 
level (Büchs 2007: 64). Since the 1980s, social partner involvement in policy-making 
focuses at the local and workplace level, rather than the national level; it is also more 
voluntary than in other northern European countries. The UK polity therefore provides 
a limited number of veto points during the engagement with, and implementation of, EU 
policy. It also provides very few avenues for actors to strategically use the OMC to 
influence national policy decisions. The latter is further important in the context of the 
UK’s Eurosceptic tradition and the limitations of using ‘Europe’ to justify domestic 
policy reforms (Hopkin and Wijnbergen 2011). The paper argues that during the Blair 
and Brown administrations, UK engagement resulted in a Europeanization effect in 
employment policy via some procedural and cognitive shifts. In contrast, during the 
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Coalition Government the UK disengaged and experienced a process of de-
Europeanization.  
 
This paper proceeds as follows. The first section analyses the existing Europeanization 
literature on the OMC, defines de-Europeanization, identifies a framework through 
which to analyse impact at the Member State level, and discusses the methodology 
adopted. The second and third sections analyse the impact of the EES during the New 
Labour Governments and the Coalition Government. The paper concludes with some 
reflections on the findings of the research, notably the limitations of cognitive and 
procedural Europeanization in a eurosceptic centralized polity.   
 
I: Europeanization and De-Europeanization in the context of the Open Method of 
Coordination  
 
Given the voluntary nature of the OMC, programmatic shifts at the national level, that is 
changes to policies and programmes such as new legislation or regulations, remain 
relatively small. Research therefore moves beyond, but includes, a focus on 
programmatic shifts, with the aim being to unpack the complex direct and indirect 
effects of the OMC in the broadest possible sense. Analysing the impact of the EES 
requires research to conceive Europeanization through a number of different variables. 
Agenda shifts refer to the ability of the OMC to place new issues onto a national political 
agenda, or to reinforce their position within the agenda hierarchy (Barcevičius et al 
2014: 11). Procedural shifts focus on the changes in governance and policy-making 
arrangements, such as the need to strengthen the horizontal integration of 
interdependent policy fields, the creation of new governance bodies, the creation or 
reinforcement of consultative and participatory structures, or closer cooperation 
between national and regional/local administrations through the creation of new 
formal coordination bodies and inter-ministerial working groups (Hamel and 
Vanhercke 2009, Zeitlin 2005). Cognitive shifts refer to changes that occur within the 
mental frameworks of domestic political actors. The OMC has helped to reframe 
national policy thinking by incorporating EU concepts and categories into domestic 
debates; exposing domestic actors to new policy approaches, often inspired by foreign 
examples; and questioning established domestic policy assumptions and programmes 
(Zeitlin 2005). On a second level the participation of national actors in the OMC can 
result in the internalization of common discursive conventions and behavioural norms. 
The construction and diffusion of EU ideas, and the socialization provided by EU 
institutions and policies, have constituted a motor of change in their own right 
(Graziano and Vink 2013).  
 
Governments (and thereby government change) are acknowledged as being an 
important determinant to the national engagement with, and impact of, the OMC. 
Drawing on the work of Castles (1982), Schmidt (1996), North (1990) and Tsebelis 
(2002), Gwiazda (2011: 551) argues that an actor-centred approach to the study of 
Europeanization and the OMC enables research to focus on the preferences of governing 
parties and how institutions can be affected by preferences. In short, the preferences of 
parties matter and since they are at the centre of the decision making process, any 
domestic shifts depend on the willingness of a government to engage in the OMC. But 
what happens when a newly elected government specifically objects to an EU policy 
governed by the OMC? A limitation of the current literature is the implicit assumption 
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that Europeanization it is a continuous ‘positive’ process, but it has little to say when 
government change results in a deprioritisation of EU objectives at the national level. 
Here we have always assumed that some basic engagement remains, albeit it is one with 
a reduced intensity and the process of Europeanization either slows down or stalls.   
 
The de-Europeanization literature is an emerging field, although there remains 
disagreement over a precise definition. Raagmaa et al (2013: 7) define the process 
when referring to Estonia’s engagement with the ESF. In this context it refers to the 
political establishment declaring that coherence with the EU is not a priority and that a 
different national interest exists. Here leaders may publically stress national interest 
and the threat of losing independence. They may also create new institutions to gain 
access to EU funds, but such institutions support existing establishments. By contrast 
for Daehnhardt (2011: 14) de-Europeanization is: ‘a practice through which a Member 
State acts intentionally so as to prevent uploading or downloading effects from 
occurring in the national and European dimensions’. A result is that a Member State 
engaging in de-Europeanization de-constructs previous advancements made through 
the process of Europeanization.  
 
For de-Europeanization to occur, some form of Europeanization must have previously 
taken place. Therefore, the starting point for research on the process is to establish the 
initial extent of Europeanization in a policy area. Second, it is important to understand 
the difference between disengagement and de-Europeanization: while the dis-
engagement of an EU member state can result in de-Europeanization, it does not 
automatically follow. De-Europeanization represents a process of disengagement 
combined with the intentional decision to reverse the impact of Europeanization. By 
contrast, the disengaging of a Member State from EU governance reflects a reduced 
intensity whereby the structures and processes that were introduced as part of the 
process of Europeanization remain more-or-less intact. Third, while previous 
definitions are good at explaining why de-Europeanization happens, i.e. a focus on 
government change,                        they do not fully elaborate on how it happens. In the 
context of the OMC, de-Europeanization is defined as -  
 
Overturning programmatic, agenda, procedural and/or cognitive shifts that have 
previously occurred when national (and/or subnational) actors have engaged with the 
OMC; with the specific aim to reverse the process of Europeanization and to prevent future 
uploading and downloading in the governance process.  
 
Table I: Europeanization and De-Europeanization in the OMC 
 
Dimension  Europeanization  De-Europeanization  
Programmatic  The introduction of new policy, or 
reforms to existing policies, that 
correspond with EU aims and 
objectives and result from 
engagement with the OMC 
Reforms and/or reversal of existing 
policy that was introduced in response 
to the OMC; or the side-lining / 
ignoring of such policies.    
 
Agenda The ability of the OMC to place new 
issues onto the political agenda, to 
increase the salience of existing 
issues, or to reinforce their 
importance.  
 
Where there was once an impact, the 
intentional blocking of the ‘OMC-effect’ 
on the political agenda.  
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Procedural   Reforms to political and 
organisational structures for the 
engagement with, and 
implementation of, the OMC.  
Reforms to political and organizational 
structures that have occurred as a 
result of engagement with the OMC, 
with the intention of disengaging and 
blocking the impact of the OMC.      
Cognitive Shifts within the mental frameworks 
of actors caused by: the incorporation 
of EU concepts and categories into 
domestic debates; and the exposure 
of actors to new policy approaches to 
compare and assess national 
developments by mutual learning.  
 
Shifts within the mental frameworks 
of actors away from EU concepts and 
categories; the comparison of 
domestic policy and approaches away 
from EU Member States and towards 
non-Member States.  
 
The above definition enables research into de-Europeanization to mirror the different 
dimensions of Europeanization. The processes through which it occurs are outlined in 
table I. Given that programmatic Europeanization is limited in the context of the OMC, 
programmatic de-Europeanization is therefore unlikely; but its inclusion into the 
framework is for the few instances where it may occur. For agenda-setting, where there 
was once an impact on the national political agenda, de-Europeanization involves the 
intentional blocking of the OMC-effect. Procedurally, de-Europeanization will involve 
the reversal of organizational structures that have been introduced to engage with the 
OMC. This reversal may include the complete disbanding of structures or their reform 
and restructuring from a once extensive apparatus to a minimal skeleton, with the latter 
providing only the very basic of levers for engagement. Cognitively, de-Europeanization 
may not occur overnight, given that ways of thinking are sticky and thereby difficult to 
change, actors may even resist such moves. However, the process can gain momentum 
in the context of procedural de-Europeanization, notably the disbanding of agents who 





The following two sections apply the above framework by tracing the UK’s engagement 
with the EES and analysing its domestic impact during New Labour (1997-2010) and 
the Coalition Government (2010-2015). Analysing the impact of the OMC is difficult for 
a number of reasons. First, during the agreement of EU guidelines, Member States will 
advocate inclusion of measures that they themselves have already introduced. It may 
therefore appear in some policy areas that the EES has affected the policy of a particular 
Member State, although this is not the case (Mailand 2009: 157; Greve 2005: 15). To 
minimise these problems research needs to pay particular attention to the timing of 
various actions and by distinguishing between compliance (whether national policy is 
in line with the EES – which might have nothing to do with the EES) and impact 
(whether the EES is a causal factor behind specific changes in national policies) 
(Mailand 2009: 157). Second, civil servants may under-estimate the impact of the EES 
(Zeitlin 2005), while documents such as the National Reform Programmes may 
intentionally camouflage differences between EU objectives and the Member States, 
recycle previous policies and claims, and overestimate the impact of the EES (De la 
Porte and Pochet 2003: 14). Despite these limitations, official documents on the EES, as 
well as interviews with civil servants who have detailed information about the political 




This article therefore draws on a number of different sources of data: 1) EU documents; 
2) UK government publications, as well as those by the social partners and NGOs; 3) the 
existing academic literature on the UK and the EES; 4) and 11 anonymous semi-
structured interviews with civil servants and social partners at the EU and national 
level. Interviewees were chosen owing to their direct involvement and experience of the 
UK/EES, with 9 of the 11 interviewees having been involved in the process for 10 years 
or more. The empirical information provided by the interviewees benefits from a long 
term perspective, including changes in the UK government and the impact of such 
changes. At the EU level interviewees include representatives from DG Employment, the 
Secretariat General and the UK’s Permanent Representation to the EU. At the national 
level they include representatives from the Department for Work and Pensions, the 
Department for Education, and the Trade Union Congress (TUC). The national level civil 
servants had experience of the Employment Committee (EMCO), as well as the penning 
of the National Reform Programme (NRP). The different sources from which this article 
draws provides multiply observation points from which to analyse the UK’s engagement 
with the EES. Where possible the points raised by the interviewees were cross-
referenced with each other, as well as official documents and the secondary literature 
on the topic. This triangulation of empirical evidence should offset sources of bias as 
much as possible (Barcevičius et al 2014: 10). 
 
II: New Labour and the EES  
 
The Employment Policy of New Labour  
 
Building on the activation policies of the previous Conservative Governments, which 
required benefit recipients to actively seek work (Lindsay and Mailand 2004), the 
Labour Party aimed to soften such policies with its ‘Third Way’ politics: an economic 
and political idea that positions itself between democratic socialism and laissez-faire 
capitalism, combining the best elements of the social market and neoliberalism. In its 
1997 election manifesto the Party proposed minimum employment standards, such as 
the national minimum wage, and to provide support programmes for vulnerable groups 
to re-enter the labour market (such as the young, long-term unemployed and lone-
parents). From 1998 onwards the government launched a number of New Deal 
programmes targeting specific groups such as young people, lone parents, the disabled, 
those 25+ and 50+ (Kitty 2005). The first New Deal for young people provided tailored 
support for those unemployed between 18 and 25. If, after six months, they were unable 
to secure unsubsidised employment there were four possible options: six months’ 
subsidised employment with training; six months’ work experience and training in the 
voluntary sector; six months’ work experience and training on an Environment Task 
Force Project; or 12 months’ full-time education and training. Forming an integral part 
of the New Deals was the 1998 launch of the Working Families Tax Credit which offered 
supplementary payments to those taking low paid work and aimed to eliminate the 
poverty trap wherein people might be better off (or not much worse off) on benefits 
(Mayhew and Wickman 2015: 151). The SureStart Centres, launched in 1998, provided 
childcare and support services to those in the most socially disadvantaged areas. It 
should also be noted that there were a number of reforms to education and training, 




Under the leadership of Gordon Brown (2007-2010) the New Deals remained in place, 
although Brown shifted the focus more on education, training, and vocational skills. The 
Blair Governments had made little substantive progress on improving the overall 
quality of education and training (see Mayhew and Wickman 2015). The 2008 
Education and Skills Act required young people to remain in education or training until 
they were 18 (previously 16 years). Spending on ALMPs during New Labour increased 
from 0.24 % of GDP in 1997, to 0.4 % by 2005, despite unemployment falling from 7 % 
to 5.5% during the period (OECD 2015). However, it should be noted that during the 
period the UK was one of the lowest per capita spenders on ALMPs in the EU.   
 
New Labour and the EES 
 
In its 1997 election manifesto New Labour promised to develop a more cooperative 
relationship between London and Brussels than had developed during its predecessors; 
believing that it was better to be at the negotiating table for EU employment policy, 
rather than to have an empty chair (Labour Party 1997). This was sold to the electorate 
by arguing that the UK would be better able to control EU employment policy by 
‘uploading’ its preferences, as well as being able to steer domestic reforms in the 
context of EU developments. This paved the way for agreement at the Amsterdam 
Treaty (1997) and the creation of the EES. Underpinning the EES was the promotion of 
active labour market policies which aim to increase employment rates by the supply 
side policies of: eliminating unconditional benefit payments; targeting the long-term 
unemployed and other socially excluded groups; increasing the incentives to re-enter 
and remain in paid employment; reducing the tax burden on employers to provide 
further incentives to hire workers; increasing working time flexibility; and investing in 
education and training (Adnett 2001: 359). Therefore, while New Labour may have 
been influenced by the broader employment policy debates across Europe, the framing 
of UK employment policy occurred prior to the 1997 launch of the EES. The EES had a 
strong goodness of fit with the post 1997 UK employment model and as such, there are 
only a few cases of direct EES impact in the UK (Mailand 2009: 160). 
 
By 2003 the UK could claim that it had already surpassed the EU target of increasing 
employment to 70 per cent, but there was often scepticism from EU partners with 
respect to the success of the UK model, particularly when it came to education, training 
and skills. Between 2000 and 2004 the UK repeatedly received recommendations 
relating to the gender pay gap and childcare, and ALMPs. A third recommendation on 
training and life-long learning was added in 2001 and repeated. The fourth 
recommendation concerned the strengthening of social partnership. It was not repeated 
in 2004, but was replaced with a new recommendation asking the UK to keep wage 
growth below productivity (Mailand 2009: 161). Although there were several political 
initiatives covered by the recommendations, research conducted by Mailand (2008: 
358) demonstrates that civil servants had difficulty showing a single clear case of 
impact from the EES and the recommendations. In this context the recommendations 
played more of a supporting role in guiding UK employment policy - they helped to keep 
issues on the agenda, but they did not put them there in the first place. For example, in 
2004 the Government Commissioned the Leitch Review on improving the skills of the 
workforce – a policy issue that the CSRs had repeatedly mentioned. While the CSRs 
were not responsible for the initiation of the review, they provided further justification 
that the government needed to address the issue (Interviews 3, 5 and 6: 2014). The 
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2007-2009 CSRs focussed on the need to further improve skills, creating stronger links 
between employment and training to improve labour productivity, and to further 
improve the employment prospects for the disadvantaged.1 In its NRPs the Government 
provided evidence of policy activity around each of the CSRs, but establishing the 
direction of causality between the two is further complicated in that by 2007, London 
was putting considerable effort into their negotiation to ensure that they corresponded, 
with national objectives (interviews 3 and 5: 2014). This strategy was important 
because it also wanted to demonstrate to the EU that is was a cooperative partner 
(Interview 6: 2014).  
 
In the context of the procedural and cognitive dimensions, there were a number of 
changes. To effectively coordinate the UK’s engagement with the EES, in 1997/1998 the 
government established the Joint International Unit (JIU) between the Department for 
Work and Pensions, the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform 
(now the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills) and the Department of 
Education. The combination of different policy areas reflected the government’s belief 
that employment policy required a ‘joined-up’ approach outside of the narrow confines 
of the UK policy paradigm. Its creation and presence would reinforce the government’s 
position on the issue across Whitehall. The JUI was responsible for coordinating and 
informing the UK position on the EES, as well as drafting the NRP. In its own words the 
JIU provided ‘effective and relevant policy and knowledge exchange in support of 
domestic policy development, including pensions and welfare’ (DWP 2008: 89). It also 
developed successful bilateral relationships with a number of EU Member States 
including France, Germany, and the Netherlands (ibid). To coordinate its position on the 
EES the JIU was directly linked to both the European Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, 
and the UK’s Permanent Representation to the European Union. This procedural change 
formed part a much broader process of reforms across Whitehall under the Step Change 
programme (1998), which provided the foundation for the projection of a more 
constructive and engaging European policy, both internally and externally (James 2009: 
613).  
 
At the height of the UK’s engagement with the EES, the JIU directly employed 
approximately 200 people (Interview 5: 2014). Representatives extensively 
participated in the numerous workshops and seminars in employment policy reform 
that were held in Brussels. A key objective was to ensure that UK policies and ideas 
were uploaded to the European level and that the Government could form tactical 
coalitions with other EU governments. A further strategic aim of both the JIU and the 
Cabinet Office was to ensure that British representatives were able to secure influential 
positions in Brussels, particularly in the Employment Committee (EMCO). EMCO, 
established in 2000, is responsible for advising the Employment and Social Affairs 
Council (EPSCO) on the progress made by the Member States over the previous 12 
months. During the Blair and Brown Governments the UK was able to secure either 
deputy chair or chairperson, which included the appointment of the first Chair of the 
Committee, Mr Clive Tucker (who was also the first head of the JIU) (Interview 6: 2014). 
This strategy was deemed to help the UK gain inside information on the EES.  
 
                                                        
1 CSRs were not issued to any member states 2005 and 2006.  
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In the context of broader procedural changes, from 2001 the devolved administrations 
contributed to the NRPs, specifically outlining their contribution to achieving the 
aspects of the EES that fall within their remit (i.e. education and training). This opened-
up communication between London and the other UK capitals on the issues and helped 
to place the EES onto their agendas. Efforts were also made to include the Regional 
Development Agencies which had been set up to promote regional growth (DWP 2000; 
2001). In terms of social partnership, the EES did very little to alter the fundamentals of 
the UK model, but it did help to open-up channels of communication (Mailand 2009: 
162). The CBI and the TUC compiled a joint report, which was included in the NRP and 
the social partners were also consulted on drafts of the NRP, although in the eyes of the 
TUC there was very little genuine consultation (Interview 1: 2014). Up until 2004 the 
NRPs also make considerable references to the government’s development of 
partnerships with the voluntary and community sector as: ‘a key means of delivering 
the UK’s employment strategy’ (DWP 2004: 73). Organisations such as the New Policy 
Institute also raised awareness of the EES in the sector to improve engagement and 
delivery (ibid). While all sides welcomed the enhanced engagement, its importance and 
significance dwindled from 2005 onwards. This corresponded with the 2005 re-launch 
of the Lisbon Strategy under the newly elected Commission President, Jose Manuel 
Barosso. Lisbon II, as it became known, emphasised growth and employment, and made 
substantive changes to the employment guidelines, with a greater emphasis on labour 
market flexibility and side-lining objectives such as job quality. This again corresponded 
well with the UK position, as Tony Blair had been a supporter of a redefined and much 
narrower focus of the Strategy (James 2012: 19).   
 
Within the DWP the EES served as a forum of exchange through which the UK could 
learn from best practice and evaluate its own progress and reforms. This shift in 
thinking did not happen overnight: as late as 2001 DWP and the House of Commons 
Work and Pension Committee preferred to organise learning visits to, and to compare 
developments with, the USA (House of Commons 2002). The subsequent shift to mainly 
northern European countries occurred for two reasons. First, the regular formal and 
informal EES meetings in Brussels provided opportunities to learn more about 
developments in other Member States. Second, the issuing of CSRs required a change of 
thinking, as it was clear that in defending its position, the UK would be unable to 
continually make comparisons with the USA; rather the ‘European’ component of the 
Strategy required it to be just that (interviews 3 and 6). EU countries subsequently 
became the dominant mode of reference, as evidenced from the reform of incapacity 
benefits in 2005 whereby the proposed reforms were evaluated in the context of 
developments in the Netherlands (House of Commons 2006). This exercise had involved 
UK national representatives visiting the Netherlands in February 2006 to meet with a 
range of civil servants and rehabilitation service providers.  
 
In short, successive Labour Governments engaged with the EES and used it to support 
domestic reforms that were already on the national political agenda. On the latter the 
process of Europeanization is therefore rather weak, but there were some notable 
cognitive and procedural shifts  
 





The Employment Policy of the Coalition Government 
 
Although the Coalition Government introduced a number of reforms to UK welfare 
policy, the fundamentals remained within the paradigm of ALMPs, albeit there is a 
stronger liberal thrust compared to New Labour. Since 2010 the focus on UK labour 
market policy has been on reducing government spending and further increasing the 
incentives for individuals to re-enter the labour market. In opposition the Conservative 
Party believed that the New Deals had not offered value for money as 40 per cent of 
participants were on benefits again within six months (Toynbee and Walker 2010: 203). 
Under the 2011 Work Programme the Government established new contracts with 
service providers involved in getting the long-term unemployed back into work. Service 
providers are now paid solely on results, dependent, not just on individuals entering 
into employment, but also on their ability to remain employed (DWP 2012). The 
programme is intended to be a much tougher successor to the various New Deals. 
Individuals who are in receipt of Job Seekers Allowance can be asked to participate in 
the programme after three months (down from six months). Between 2010 and 2011 
public expenditure on ALMPs, as a percentage of GDP, fell from 0.39 to 0.23 percent, 
despite unemployment remaining at 8 per cent during the period (OECD 2015). To 
complement the Work Programme, the 2013 Benefit Cap places a £500 per week benefit 
limit a couple or single parent can claim (£350 for a single person). This policy is 
intended to further incentivise employment by ensuring that total benefits received do 
not exceed average annual earnings.  
 
The Coalition Government and the EES 
 
As with New Labour the similarities between UK employment policy and the EES under 
Europe 2020 suggest a causal link between EU and UK policy. EU-driven austerity and 
increases in unemployment during the early years of the financial have put employment 
policy under pressure. Under these conditions one possible solution to reduce 
unemployment is to tighten the conditionality surrounding the receipt of 
unemployment benefit, as well as creating stronger financial incentives for individuals 
to return to work. With participation in the Work Programme a requirement after three 
months of benefit receipt, down from six under the New Deal, and the introduction of 
the benefit cap, the Coalition Government’s reforms corresponded to the EU’s post 2010 
policy paradigm. But the evidence presented below points to the convergence of the two 
as being coincidental rather than causal.  
 
In its 2010 party manifesto the Conservative Party, traditionally a Eurosceptic party, 
argued that the ‘steady and unaccountable intrusion of the European Union into almost 
every aspect of our lives has gone too far’ (Conservative Party 2010). It pledged to 
return powers from the EU including the Charter on Fundamental Rights, criminal 
justice law, and social and employment legislation. The backdrop against this position is 
the long held Conservative Party belief that the purpose of the EU is to serve as a free 
trade area and that political union, as well as attempts to harmonise or coordinate 
policy outside of the Single European Market, represent an infringement upon national 
sovereignty. Failing to win and outright majority in the 2010 election, the Conservative 
Party formed a coalition government with the minority Liberal Democrat party – 
historically a pro EU party – in May of that year. In the coalition agreement the two 
parties reached an understanding whereby no further powers would be transferred 
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from Brussels without a UK referendum on the issue. The government also agreed to 
examine the balance of the EU’s existing competences and to limit the application of the 
Working Time Directive in the UK. The result was the launching of the Balance of 
Competences exercise in July 2012.       
 
The Government appointed Iain Duncan Smith, regarded as an ardent Eurosceptic in the 
Conservative Party, as the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions. This corresponded 
with the final negotiations and preparations for Europe 2020, which was agreed in the 
European Council in June 2010. Although the Brown Government had been opposed to 
the poverty target in Europe 2020 (Copeland and Daly 2012), it was supportive of the 
targets in education and employment, as they corresponded with the Labour Party’s 
agenda for both the UK and the EU in the EES (Labour Party 2010). The nature of these 
negotiations resulted in the newly formed government not having participated in the 
final agreement, and in the eyes of the DWP under Ian Duncan Smith, it lacked 
legitimacy. To this the Conservative Party also believed that successive Labour 
Governments had placed too greater emphasis on ‘top-down’ targets for government 
policy and promised to abolish them (Conservative Party 2010). The decision to abolish 
national targets also filtered through to the UK’s post 2010 relationship with the EU, as 
London refused to set national targets for Europe 2020 and thereby the EES: it has been 
the only Member State to do so despite repeated calls from the European Commission. 
In February 2011 UK Employment Minister, Chris Grayling, spoke out against what he 
called European "one-size-fits-all programmes" and advocated a more decentralised 
approach towards helping the unemployed, based on financial incentives rather than 
numerical targets (Grayling 2011). 
 
This symbolic act marks the beginning of a process of UK disengagement with the EES 
and eventual de-Europeanization, particularly in the procedural and cognitive 
dimensions. There remains legal uncertainty with respect to whether or not the UK was 
required to set national quantitative targets for the EES. The EES is covered by Articles 
145-150 of the TFEU, but no explicit mention is made to ‘quantitative targets’ rather: 
‘Member States, having regard to national practices related to the responsibilities of 
management and labour, shall regard promoting employment as a matter of common 
concern and shall coordinate their action in this respect within the Council’ (Article 
146). The UK government argues that the mentioning of ‘having regard to national 
practices’ in article 146 provides sufficient justification for the UK not to set national 
targets for Europe 2020 because government policy is to abolish all quantitative targets 
at the national level (EurActiv 2011, European Commission 2014). A further point of 
contention related to the inclusion of education and training under the remit of the EES 
(Interview 10: 2014). The TFEU does not make specific reference to it, but the European 
Council has always assumed that education and training are part of the EES. The 
Coalition Government continually stressed that education and training should not 
feature in the CSRs, which should be re-written around a narrower understanding of 
employment to focus on the financial incentives to return to work (Interview 11: 2014). 
Unlike the New Labour Governments, the Coalition Government’s strategy for the EES is 
one that explicitly emphasises the right to national self-determination. Rather than 
attempting to upload its preferences to the European level and shape the political 
debate, the Coalition Government simply disputed the legality of the ESS and refused to 




The Coalition Government has taken a number of steps to de-Europeanize the 
procedural and cognitive shifts that occurred under New Labour. Following the 2010 
Coalition Government Spending Review, DWP, home to the JIU, was to receive a funding 
cut of £11.6 billion. By 2014 this had resulted in over 30,000 job loses across the 
Department, but the vast majority of these were in front line services. In the Whitehall 
Office the numbers employed have remained constant (1672 in 2010 and 1654 in 
2014), but there has been considerable reorganisation2. Part of this reorganisation has 
resulted in the disbanding of the JIU and its replacement with a smaller unit of some 27 
representatives drawn from DWP; it no longer contains representatives from the 
Departments of Education, and the Department of Business, Innovation and Skills. The 
rationale for this restructuring is twofold. First, it represents a reframing of 
employment policy in the UK to a relatively narrow understanding that does not 
directly include education, training and skills policy, and prefers to emphasise financial 
incentives (Interview 11: 2014). Second, the reduced scope and personnel of the IU 
reflects a de-prioritisation of the government’s engagement with the EES (and more 
broadly Europe 2020) and a new ideological belief within the Cabinet Office that the 
EU’s competence in the field is both questionable and unnecessary (Interview 11: 
2014).  
 
Within the respective Whitehall Departments, existing bilateral relationships with EU 
Member States have deteriorated. Some of this shift reflects the disbanding of the JIU, 
the redeployment of its staff to other units/departments, and the breakdown of 
personal relationships that existed with counterparts in other EU Member States. On a 
second level the IU has formed a strategic partnership with China and other East Asian 
Countries for policy learning and the exchange of best practice. The signing of the 
September 2015 ‘UK-China Strategic Framework in Education’, under the new 
Conservative Government, reflects the intensified collaboration that developed during 
the Coalition Government (UK Government 2015). There have also been broader 
procedural changes, particularly with respect to the relationship between Westminster 
and the devolved administrations. While the NRPs still make reference to other parts of 
the UK, they are not fully consulted on the matter. From 2011 onwards this prompted 
the Scottish Government to start writing its own NRP. Communication and consultation 
with actors such as the TUC and CBI has also ended. Given the Government’s ideological 
position on the TUC, this is unsurprising, but the absence of consultation with the CBI or 
other NGOs is indicative of how little effort was being put into the EES by London.  
  
At the EU level the UK became conspicuously absent in the governance process. The 
regular meetings of EPSCO feature Social Attachés from the Member States, and while 
attendance to these meetings has often fluctuated, ‘the Brits have become absent and do 
not send an attaché’ (Interview 2: 2014). This is in stark contrast to the both Blair and 
Brown Governments where the aim was to always be at the negotiating table to ensure 
that UK preferences were uploaded. Furthermore, UKREP, which historically has had a 
close relationship with members of the Employment Committee, has reduced its 
engagement and lobbying of the Commission. There is a perception that such meetings 
are mere talking shops and are unproductive (interview 11: 2014).    
 
                                                        




In the context of the CSRs, the Commission has become more prescriptive under Europe 
2020, arguing that this is justified because of the importance of generating long-term 
fiscal stability, financial stability and thereby growth and jobs (Interviews 7, 8 and 9: 
2014). Paradoxically the Coalition Government put less effort into their negotiation 
compared to its predecessors, arguing that the broader reforms surrounding EU 
governance are only necessary for members of the Eurozone (Interview 9 2014). 
Interviewees believed that the Commission was being more lenient in its CSRs for the 
UK and was aware of the political sensitivity of overstepping its reach. Between 2011 
and 2014 the UK was issued with six CSRs, which broadly focused on youth 
unemployment and improvements to education and training. Ascertaining the 
Coalition’s response to the CSRs is less clear-cut than under New Labour for two 
reasons. First, for the CSRs in education and skills, the Government initially highlighted 
the Education and Skills Act passed under the Brown Government. Since the inception 
of the EES such recycling of policy to demonstrate national progress has been a common 
feature and is therefore not unusual. The UK has also been issued with a CSR on 
implementing the EU’s Youth Contract, but UK policy in the area is considered to be 
incompatible with EU policy (see below). While the CSRs were often used internally by 
New Labour to further justify its policy reforms, the Coalition Government disregarded 
them.  
 
In 2012 the Coalition Government introduced the Youth Contract which aimed to 
reduce youth unemployment by: providing wage-incentives to employers who recruit 
an 18-24-year-old who has previously spent six months or more on benefits; create 
250,000 work experience places; and provide young people with greater support from 
personal advisors. Concerned by rising levels of youth unemployment across the EU, in 
2013 the European Council and the Commission initiated their own EU-wide youth 
strategy. This involved ring-fencing €6.4 billion of the European Social Fund (ESF) to 
spend to partially fund the scheme, with the remainder covered by the Member States. 
However, the EU Youth Guarantee differed to the Youth Contract in that: it applied to 
young people who were unemployed for four months; and was to provide them with a 
job offer, apprenticeship, traineeship or continued education. The UK government 
objected to the proposal and found itself in isolation in the Council. It argued that the 
allocation of EU funds to address youth unemployment was beyond the EU’s formal 
competences, added to which the Youth Contract was unsuitable for the UK (Interview 
4: 2014). According to the UK Minister of State for Employment most young people 
usually come off benefits after six months and ‘it would be inappropriate to put the 
support in earlier’ as stipulated in the Youth Guarantee (House of Lords 2014: 32). To 
access the funds, governments were to submit and implementation plan to the 
European Commission, but by the January 2014 deadline, the UK was the only Member 
State not to. The Government submitted its plan two months late in which it said that 
while it supported the aims of the Youth Guarantee, it would not be accessing the funds. 
The point was also reiterated in the 2014 UK NRP which it said the UK: ‘has chosen to 
take a different approach which it believes better suits the national specificities and 
circumstances faced by young people in the UK’ (UK GOV 2014: 21).  
 
The Government’s position had not gone unnoticed by the House of Lords, as well as the 
Scottish Parliament. In 2013 the House of Lords Select Committee ‘EU Internal Market, 
Infrastructure and Employment Sub Committee’ began its scrutiny of the Youth 
Contract and questioned the Government’s position. Its report, published in April 2014, 
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concluded that the EU did have sufficient competence to use the ESF to fight youth 
unemployment and that the Government should access the funds. The Government’s 
position was also criticised in debates on youth unemployment in the Scottish 
Parliament. This very open criticism generated a shift within Government thinking and 
it proposed to the European Commission to use the EU’s Youth Guarantee funds to 
support the Youth Contract. The Commission found itself in a dilemma; the EU’s Youth 
Guarantee emphasises improving labour supply through education and training, and 
applies after four months; while the UK’s Youth Contract predominantly focuses on 
demand-side policies by providing employers with financial incentives after six months. 
The Commission was concerned that a refusal to give the UK some 186 million Euros 
would feed into the domestic eurosceptic debate, but releasing the funds would result in 
them being used for policies that had not directly been agreed by the Council (Interview 
7: 2014). Eventually, in June 2014 the Commission conceded and approved the money 
to be used for the Youth Contract.  
 
As with New Labour the fit between UK employment policy during the Coalition 
Government and the EES was coincidental, but unlike its predecessor, it attempted to 
insulate itself from the effects of EU policy. To do this it not only disengaged from the 
governance process, but reversed the effects of UK engagement that had occurred 
during New Labour. The result was a process of de-Europeanization that is most 
evident in the procedural and cognitive dimensions, as outlined in table II.  
 
Table II: Europeanization and De-Europeanization in the UK 
 
Dimension  Europeanization during New Labour 
(1997-2010) 
De-Europeanization during the 
Coalition Government (2010-2015).  
Programmatic  Strong ‘goodness-of-fit’ between the UK 
and the EES; little evidence of 
Europeanization.  
No scope for de-Europeanization.  
Strong ‘goodness-of-fit’ between UK and 
EU policy, but this is coincidental.  
Agenda  Limited Evidence of Europeanization: 
Supported issues that were already on 
the national agenda; engagement with 
the CSRs, but difficult to isolate 
causality.  
Limited De-Europeanization: Disputes 
the EU’s competence in the EES; argues 
that UK practices and priorities are 
different to the EU and blocks any 
attempt by the EU to influence the 
national agenda; pays little, if any, 
attention to the CSRs.  
Procedural  Evidence of Europeanization:  Creation 
of the Joint International Unit to 
coordinate engagement with the EES; 
some input from devolved 
administrations, NGOs and social 
partners, but this changed over time.  
Evidence of De-Europeanization: The 
disbanding of the Joint International 
Unit; marginalisation of devolved 
administrations; complete removal of 
NGOs and social partners from the 
process.  
Cognitive  Evidence of Europeanization: Significant 
policy learning from EU Member States; 
shift in thinking from USA to Northern 
EU Member States.   
Evidence of de-Europeanization: The 
refocusing of policy learning away from 




Analysing the effects of government change on the process of Europeanization for the 
OMC not only enables differences and similarities to be compared but, in the context of 
the UK, also provides an insight into the limits of Europeanization in a Eurosceptic 
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centralised polity with a limited number of veto players. The employment policies of 
both New Labour and the Coalition Government had a strong goodness-of-fit with the 
EES, but their approaches to engagement contrast sharply with each other. The New 
Labour Governments were keen to upload UK policy preferences to the EU level, so as to 
minimise the costs of downloading. Despite little evidence of programmatic shifts in 
employment policy, the EES played a supportive role to the employment policy agenda 
of New Labour, and there were some procedural and cognitive shifts in the UK polity. In 
this respect the UK experienced a process of Europeanization, although it may not have 
been as extensive as in some other Member States.  
 
Upon entering office in 2010 the majority partner of the Coalition Government was the 
eurosceptic Conservative Party. It found itself in a situation whereby the Employment 
Guidelines of Europe 2020 had already been agreed, but there was a strong goodness-
of-fit between them and the employment policy of the Coalition Government. Rather 
than building on the process of Europeanization experienced under New Labour, the 
Coalition Government resisted the influence of the EES on the national political agenda 
including a refusal to respond adequately to the Country Specific Recommendations, 
and disputing the EU’s competence in employment field policy. Its disengagement with 
the EES corresponded with the intentional decision to reverse the procedural and 
cognitive shifts that had occurred under its predecessor - a process known as de-
Europeanization.  
 
The UK’s experience with the EES points to the importance of government change. 
While the Europeanization literature has long acknowledged that such change can have 
an impact on actor engagement, this is normally cast in a positive light, i.e. a ratcheting 
up of Europeanization. As the findings of the paper demonstrate, government change 
can also result in de-Europeanization, this illustrates that there is nothing unidirectional 
with respect Europeanization: it can roll-forward, but it can also rollback. The particular 
conditions under which Europeanization occurred in the UK illustrate the limitations of 
Europeanization in a centralized polity with a limited number of veto-players. The 
process of Europeanization during New Labour was confined to Whitehall, particularly 
the Cabinet Office and DWP. Although a small number of UK actors outside Whitehall 
were aware of, and involved in, the EES, their numbers were insufficient to resist the 
process of de-Europeanization once the government changed in 2010. These findings 
call for a greater reflection on the conditions through which de-Europeanization can 
occur. For the UK, its centralized polity, particularly in the context of employment 
policy, is significant, as procedural and cognitive de-Europeanization was relatively 
easy to achieve. However, we also need to give account to the UK’s Eurosceptic 
tendencies. The Labour Governments were unable to use the EES to justify their labour 
market reforms because from the mid 1990s, UK public opinion was showing signs of 
increased scepticism towards the European project, which made appeals to European 
constraints an unlikely source of domestic political support (Hopkin and van 
Wijnbergen 2011: 2011). Had the EES featured more prominently in public discourse, 
the process of de-Europeanization may have been more contested, although the extent 
of such contestation remains an unknown. Such findings further contextualise the 
process of Europeanization in what Graziano et al (2011: 320) refer to as Anglo-Saxon 
economies with a limited policy misfit. The article points to the fragility of OMC inspired 
Europeanization in such a setting. Whether the fragility of procedural and cognitive 
Europeanization is confined to a few Member States of similar political conditions to the 
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UK remains unclear, but the case study highlights the need to take de-Europeanization 
seriously, particularly in the context of rising euroscepticism across the EU.        
 
One final issue to consider is the relationship between de-Europeanization and the 
OMC. Although domestic political structures are important determinants in the 
processes of Europeanization and de-Europeanization, it should be noted that 
governance processes such as the OMC are continuously evolving. Since 2010 the 
governance structures surrounding the EES have shifted under the European Semester, 
the EU’s annual governance cycle to monitor engagement and progress in macro, micro 
and employment policies at Member State level. Under the European Semester 
Eurozone members are subject to much greater scrutiny of their economic and 
employment policies than they were during the Lisbon Strategy. This includes the 
enhanced surveillance of progress around the Country Specific Recommendations for 
employment. As the UK is an example of a Member State outside of the Eurozone, it 
remains to be seen as to whether de-Europeanization is limited to Eurosceptic non-
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